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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For the past twenty years, Asia has been regarded as an
economic success story. The recent economic turmoil in the
region, however, has prompted a reevaluation of the long-
term sustainability of the dynamic economic performance.
Undoubtedly, lessons will be drawn from the Asian experi-
ence—lessons that will inform future decisions at various
levels to move financial liberalization forward while
providing for prudential concerns.
Many thoughtful analysts surveying the Asian
experience have focused on the inadequacies and inefficiencies
in the banking systems of Asian nations as particularly signifi-
cant elements in precipitating the current crisis. The banking
problems of these nations, however, only bring into specific
relief deep, complex, and more pervasive problems in the
institutional arrangements of the affected nations—problems
that are, in fact, common to many emerging market countries
throughout the world. These issues have particular relevance
to the consideration of future financial liberalization and the
broadening of the international financial community via
multilateral trade negotiations and international under-
standings among national financial supervisors.
II. AN OUTLINE OF THE POLICY PROBLEM
This paper sets out to discuss a policy problem involving
the integration of emerging market banking systems into
international financial markets. Below is an outline of the
policy problem:
Policy problem.  Promote financial market liberalization in
emerging economies through the exploitation of interna-
tional financial linkages, including interbank transactions.
Constraint. Satisfy system-wide prudential policy needs.
Premise. As long as entry of foreign banks is restricted,
domestic banks have superior capacity to gather informa-
tion on domestic economic actors and discriminate among
those actors.
Instruments that can be applied to the solution of the policy
problem:
• robust institutional arrangements;1
• design of macroeconomic policy instruments;
• binding international agreements such as the Financial
Services Agreement of the General Agreement on
Trade and Services; and
• multilateral understandings such as the Basle Core
Principles.
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we
explicate the policy problem through an overview discussion
of the Asian experience. In Section IV, we consider institu-
tional deficiencies in emerging market countries and their
negative implications for prudent banking. We also extend
the discussion to include the impact of institutional issues
on the credit relationships between domestic and foreign
banks. In Section V, we discuss the relevance of trade agree-
ments in financial services and agreements among supervi-
sors to the process of integrating emerging markets into
international banking markets. Drawing on the insights of
incomplete contracting theory, we consider how the
involvement of emerging market countries might influence
both the form and the coverage of multilateral agreements
covering prudential standards.
III. PUTTING THE POLICY PROBLEM
IN CONTEXT
Our statement of the general policy problem has been
informed by the Asian experience. Many observers link the
poor macroeconomic performance of Asian emerging market
countries in the recent past to an inconsistency in economic
policy: although these countries encouraged domestic
institutions to be actively involved in international finan-
cial markets, they did not at the same time aggressively
pursue domestic institutional reform. The Asian economies
made efforts to implement financial market liberalization
by removing restrictions, for example, on the character and
magnitude of funding activities that Asian banks could
conduct in international interbank markets.
Over the last decade, Asian governments sought to
support the preeminent role of their banking systems as
sources of finance for investment projects by removing
interest rate controls and by initiating other liberalizing
measures designed to avoid disintermediation. The policies
were successful in that they permitted seemingly well-
capitalized banks to assume investment responsibility for
large amounts of domestic and foreign savings. They were
unsuccessful, ex post, in that many of the projects financed
did not generate sufficient revenues to meet contractual
loan payments. The eventual result has been the current
crisis in Asia, which has generated both domestic economic
problems in affected Asian countries and concern about the
impact on banks in other countries. This outcome can be
associated with the deficient state of institutional arrange-
ments in emerging Asian economies. In particular, these
economies commonly lack complete legal arrangements as
well as well-developed mechanisms to produce good
accounting information. In turn, this produces a lack of
transparency in corporate financial affairs, distorted incen-
tive structures for economic agents, and a lack of certainty
as to the locus of corporate control. In the next section, we
will look more closely at how the deficient institutional
arrangements create difficulties for the making of prudent
credit decisions and can in fact generate prudential concerns.




As noted above, many emerging market countries lack strong
accounting mechanisms and traditions. Numerous factors
may contribute to these weaknesses. First, many countries lack
legal requirements for the independent auditing of financial
statements. Second, the limited penetration of sophisticated
accounting systems in many emerging market countries
reduces the quality and timeliness of financial data. In addi-
tion, the lack of liquid, well-developed asset markets in these
nations often limits the validity of financial information; com-
panies must use internal estimates of values rather than objec-
tive, transparent, market-based observations. Finally, the
values of corporate transparency, avoidance of conflicts of
interest, and safeguarding of corporate assets are not fully
ingrained in some of the emerging markets.
Furthermore, macroeconomic policies in emerging
markets often make prudent banking more difficult, as
foreseeable consequences of those policies cannot be
managed readily by emerging market banks with under-
developed risk management systems. As the Asian experi-
ence demonstrates, the choice of exchange rate regime can
introduce instability into the domestic banking markets.
To some extent, this occurred in Mexico in 1994 and 1995.
The most striking example of this phenomenon, however,
took place in Chile in the late 1970s. Diaz-AlejandroFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 215
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(1983) reported that real lending rates in Chile averaged
more than 75 percent per annum over the period 1975-82.
It was not surprising to him that, in these circumstances,
Chilean banks borrowed heavily in foreign currency and
lent the proceeds to domestic customers. Finally, he noted
that Chilean banks had not taken into account the substi-
tution of exchange rate risk exposure for credit risk. This
failure, in turn, contributed to Chilean bank failures.
Stylized Example
To provide additional insight into the impact of these
institutional issues on banking markets, we will present a
stylized example based on the Asian experience. To begin
with, let us consider the economic and financial circum-
stances present in Asia.
The slowdown in economic growth in Asia has
been reflected in sharp deteriorations in the cash holdings
(liquidity) of Asian companies.2 It seems apparent, based
on available data, that in some cases companies chose to
respond to these cash squeezes by taking on currency risk
through arrangement and drawdowns of hard currency
credit facilities from domestic and foreign banks. Compa-
nies found these hard currency credit facilities attractive
because they permitted the companies to reduce the rate
of drawdown of their cash reserves by lowering interest
payments. The reduced cash flow came at the cost of the
assumption of financial risk of a depreciation of the
domestic currency.
The chart shows data for two countries: Korea and
Thailand. For both of these countries, there was a strong
association of the buildup of the foreign borrowing of
domestic banks with the increase in domestic credit exten-
sions to the domestic private sector. The greater steepness
of the foreign bank borrowing line in both cases is consis-
tent with a story that external bank borrowing was under-
taken to accommodate the corporate sector’s heightened
interest in conserving scarce cash liquidity. We would
caution, however, that available data do not permit us to
verify the presumed behavior that banks passed on the
currency risk to liquidity-constrained corporate borrowers.
Now let us develop our stylized example. Con-
sider the following circumstances regarding the exchange
rate environment. The monetary authorities are seeking
to avoid currency depreciation through open-market
purchases. To hold a position in the domestic currency,
market participants require compensation in the form of
higher domestic interest rates for the anticipated future
depreciation.3
Let us assume that the borrowing behavior
described above is sufficiently prevalent among the borrow-
ers of a particular bank that a depreciation of the exchange
rate would significantly increase the credit exposures of that
bank. Furthermore, assume that the bank’s credit decisions
are based on a single criterion, the borrower’s credit history,
reflecting the only information available to the bank.4 This
assumption is based on the notion that domestic corporates
either do not prepare financial data or that the data they pre-
pare are of highly uncertain value and therefore cannot be
relied on as a basis for credit decisions. An important charac-
teristic of the data on the borrowing history is that they have
only been accumulated during an observation period in
which the sensitivities of borrowers’ financial situations to
exchange rate movements could not be observed.216 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
Now, let us consider the consequences to the bank
of a depreciation of the currency. The immediate impact of
the depreciation would be to increase exposures to all bor-
rowers who have been loaned funds in the foreign currency.
The bank, given the information available, would have no
way to assess the consequences of the depreciation on the
ability of any particular borrower to pay. The depreciation
may have impaired the ability of some borrowers, who
are unhedged, to honor their debt obligations. Other
borrowers, however, who are effectively hedged (for exam-
ple, those who have receivables denominated in the foreign
currency) would not be adversely affected by the deprecia-
tion. Let us assume that a borrower of each type approaches
the bank to restructure its loan. Each borrower requests
that its loan payment, expressed in domestic currency, be
no more than required before depreciation. Given the
absence of firm financial information, the bank has no
objective basis to differentiate among the two applicants
for debt relief. Thus, the bank faces the possible result that
if it gives concessional terms to both applicants, it has
advantaged one unnecessarily. If it does not permit the con-
cessional terms, it forces one borrower into bankruptcy
unnecessarily. And if it takes the final choice and offers one
concession and denies the other, it faces the possibility of
ending up in the worst of possible worlds in which one
borrower defaults and the other is unnecessarily provided
with reduced payments.
Now let us bring the domestic bank/foreign bank
relationship into our analysis. Assume that the only infor-
mation disclosed to a foreign bank is data on the level of
nonperforming loans of the domestic bank. In the period
before depreciation, differences in the levels of nonperform-
ing loans among banks would not have systematically
revealed the hedging or nonhedging of these banks’ bor-
rowers. The analysis above suggests that if the concentra-
tion of a bank’s loans is to unhedged borrowers, then
depreciation might result in a large increase in nonper-
forming loans. But this characteristic of the bank’s loan
portfolio would be revealed only ex post. This demon-
strates how the foreign bank, in the absence of effective
monitoring mechanisms, would not have the wherewithal
to alter the way it processes information and makes credit
decisions. Such mechanisms could inform decision making
at foreign banks, and could therefore lead to avoidance of
exposures to those domestic banks likely to be affected by a
currency depreciation.
This example suggests the potential value of
forward-looking information. Such information can be
produced by stress tests.5 The tests are particularly useful
when historical experience has been limited by successful
government efforts to fix asset prices (most prominently,
fixed exchange or interest rates). The information drawn
from these tests can support alternate projections of cash
flows, so bank managements can take various contingencies
into account for purposes of capital planning.6
B. THE BANKRUPTCY REGIME
Let us now turn to the relevance of a country’s bankruptcy
regime on the relationship between the domestic bank and
the domestic borrower as well as between the foreign bank
and the domestic bank. We will consider how deficient
rules for corporate debt workouts, and in particular viola-
tion of the absolute priority rule (APR), undermine the
ability of both domestic banks to make credit decisions on
the corporate level and foreign banks to make discrimina-
tions among domestic banks in the interbank market.
Again, the experience of Asia is both especially instructive
and particularly relevant.
Economic analysis of bankruptcy arrangements
has focused on the impact of the bankruptcy regime, and in
particular the absolute priority rule, on the efficiency of
financial contracting (see Longhofer [1997]). The absolute
priority rule provides for the retention in bankruptcy of the
priority of claims established outside of bankruptcy. In
other words, the most senior creditors should be paid off
before anything is given to the next senior creditors, and so
on down to the shareholders.
Asian countries appear to have a high tolerance for
violations of APR. This has been traced by legal scholars to
Asian cultural traditions as well as to the influence of European
civil law heritages in a number of countries, including
Indonesia.7 The character of significant violations of APR,
which we think are prevalent, is suggested by the follow-
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company with $330 million in debt, creditors will forgive
95 percent of their debt and shareholders will retain an
interest in the company. The terms reflect the power of the
dominant shareholder to veto proposed restructuring
arrangements, a widely recognized shortcoming of Thailand’s
bankruptcy arrangements.8
In the case of Korea, violations of APR have been
associated with the behavior of entrenched managements.
The managements of bankrupt chaebols and other large
Korean companies have been able to apply for court media-
tion which, when granted, has permitted them to stay in
place. This process violates the absolute priority rule
because control of corporate assets has not been transferred
to the new owners. The Korean government has now pro-
posed legislation that restricts the opportunities of man-
agements at troubled companies to entrench themselves.9
Now let us evaluate the impact of violation of
APR on the creditor relationship between the domestic
bank and borrower. The higher the probability of APR vio-
lations in a given legal structure, the less incentive owners/
managers have to avoid bankruptcy. The lessened incentive
reflects the diminished discrepancy in outcomes between
the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy states. In these circum-
stances, the domestic creditor bank would be less favorably
treated than in the absence of APR violations.
 Consider the case where the domestic bank does
have special ability vis-à-vis foreign banks to discriminate
between domestic companies as to the likelihood of
default. The presence of such a superior capacity helps
explain why foreign banks would choose to fund domestic
banks’ extensions of credit to domestic borrowers. That is,
the presence of APR violations enhances the domestic
banks’ advantage.
To summarize, badly structured bankruptcy
regimes can result in the increased likelihood of bank-
ruptcy (because of the reduction in incentives) and reduced
recoveries in states of bankruptcy, and thus will tend to
reduce the attractiveness for creditors of debt positions in
those economies. As well, poor bankruptcy arrangements
increase the likelihood that foreign banks will use domestic
banks as intermediaries in lending relationships with
domestic corporate borrowers.
Our analysis above provides a basis for the pre-
sumption that the interests of emerging market countries
would be served by addressing institutional failings. Addi-
tionally, instability in domestic financial markets associated
with such institutional arrangements could be transmitted
to international markets. Therefore, international supervi-
sors also have incentives for evaluating the state of institu-
tional arrangements in emerging market countries when
considering whether and how to negotiate on international
prudential and financial liberalization issues.
V. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
This section reviews the consequences of the size and com-
position of the group participating in international pru-
dential and liberalization agreements on the contractual
character of those agreements. In particular, we focus on
the significance for international liberalization and super-
visory arrangements on the inclusion of emerging market
countries. In connection with this discussion, we review
three agreements: the Basle Capital Accord, the Financial
Services Agreement of the General Agreement on Trade
and Services, and the Basle Committee’s Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision.
A. BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD
The Basle Capital Accord is an understanding among the
bank supervisory agencies of the G-10 member countries.
The agreement, signed in 1988, was undertaken during a
period when these authorities expressed interest in a
shared-rule framework for judging the financial strength of
applicant banks, which were, at that time, primarily from
each other’s countries. The thrust of the revised Basle
Accord (updated to include the coverage by capital regula-
tion of market risks) can be summarized as follows:
1. A bank must hold equity capital equal to at least a
fixed percent of its risk-weighted credit exposures
as well as capital to cover market risks in the
bank’s trading account.
2. When performance causes capital to fall below this
minimum requirement, shareholders can retain
control provided that they recapitalize the bank to
meet the minimum capital ratio.218 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
3. If the shareholders fail to do so, the bank’s regula-
tory agency is required to sell or liquidate the
bank.
The Basle Accord provides de facto liberalization
by establishing a transparent standard for the crucial vari-
able, capital, that is used in making judgments on various
applications, including those for entry, of foreign banks.
Due to its transparent framework and simplicity, the agree-
ment operates to limit discretion for supervisors in signa-
tory countries and other countries that voluntarily chose to
adhere to it.
It is instructive to consider what lessons the
Accord provides regarding the factors that influence the
outcome of contracting among groups of national supervi-
sory authorities. Economic analysis of contracting would
suggest that the small size and homogenous character of
the group of signatories explain the simplicity of the Basle
Capital Accord. These characteristics allowed the negotia-
tions to be effectively limited to questions involving
capital issues.10 Additionally, the cost and complexity of
negotiations were reduced as the agreement does not
involve formal treaty obligations and accords flexibility in
national implementation.
Let us consider the case that can be made to use
the Basle Accord as a complete and controlling interna-
tional prudential agreement covering all banking systems,
including those of the emerging markets. Four characteris-
tics of the Basle Accord are inconsistent with this case.
First, the framers of the Accord implicitly pre-
sumed that the signatory countries had compatible
institutional arrangements. As discussed above, in many
cases the institutional failings of emerging market coun-
tries make them incompatible with those of established
financial centers.
Second, the Accord is an incomplete agreement
that affords considerable discretion to national supervisory
authorities. For example, it provides no guidance as to how
signatory supervisors should address failures of bank share-
holders to meet agreed minimum requirements. The dis-
parate implementation of prompt corrective action
initiatives in the United States and Japan affirms this
observation.11 Additionally, the Accord offers no specific
guidance as to the circumstances in which a host country
supervisor may close a branch office of a foreign bank.12
Because of the incomplete nature of the contract, national
supervisors in G-10 countries have had to expend consider-
able effort to make adaptations and to develop informal
understandings in order to keep the Basle Accord relevant
and useful. Enlargement of the group of nations con-
sulted in this process would considerably increase the
costs of reaching consensus on modifications of the Accord
and could possibly discourage needed adaptations.
Third, the Basle Accord is tightly focused on
issues related to capital measurement and the setting of
minimum capital adequacy standards. For example, it does
not offer standards for banks’ efforts to identify, measure,
monitor, and control material risks. It would be important
to reach agreement on standards such as these if the group
of countries negotiating standards became more diverse.
Fourth, there is no formal enforcement mechanism
in the Accord. In the signatory countries, there has been an
increased understanding that formal enforcement mecha-
nisms such as prompt corrective action are required at the
national level. The same view, however, has not become as
widely accepted in emerging market countries. In the
absence of an enforcement mechanism, enlargement of the
signatory group risks the introduction of a rogue national
banking system into international markets. The presence of
such a rogue signatory could undercut the understandings
on which the normal functioning of the international inter-
bank markets are based.
B. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND 
SERVICES AND THE BASLE CORE PRINCIPLES
In this section, we will consider how emerging markets
might be brought into the Basle-based discussions. To begin,
however, it is important to appreciate the importance of the
separate process of negotiating international liberalization
organized under the aegis of the World Trade Organization.
The General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS) promotes competitive and efficient markets world-
wide. In particular, the Financial Services Agreement of
GATS brought trade in financial services into a global
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trade in goods (see Key [1997]). The agreement calls for a
process of liberalization involving the reduction or removal
of barriers to foreign financial services and foreign financial
services providers from national markets.
The coverage of financial services by GATS is
modified by the so-called prudential carve-out. The carve-
out permits signatory countries to take measures for pru-
dential purposes notwithstanding other GATS provisions.
However, limited guidance has been provided as to what
constitutes prudential measures. It is clear only that the
carve-out permits measures for the protection of various
classes of stakeholders such as policyholders and depositors
or “to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial
system.” Therefore, fleshing out the meaning of the pru-
dential carve-out requires reference to alternative sources.
Consider the character of guidance that would be
provided for this concept by the recently drafted Basle Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The Core
Principles are intended to serve as a basic reference for
supervisory and other public authorities. That is, they
provide general, not detailed, guidance on an extensive
listing of topics (see Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion [1997]). The Core Principles were drafted by represen-
tatives from the Basle Committee’s G-10 member
countries and nine emerging market countries. Supervisors
from all countries, however, are being encouraged to
endorse the Core Principles. The Basle Core Principles com-
prise twenty-five basic standards that relate to: precondi-
tions for effective banking supervision (Principle 1),
licensing and structure (Principles 2 to 5), prudential
regulation and requirements (Principles 6 to 15), methods
of ongoing banking supervision (Principles 16 to 20),
information requirements (Principle 21), formal powers
of supervisors (Principle 22), and cross-border banking
(Principles 23 to 25).
The Core Principles employ the concept of capital
regulation established in the Basle Accord. To this they
add an extensive set of supervision issues. One might
interpret the greater breadth of the Principles as reflecting
the now-established international sentiment that improve-
ments need to be made in the supervisory systems of many
countries.
VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE BASLE ACCORD 
METHODOLOGY
The breadth of the Core Principles may make them more
useful than the Basle Accord for extended application to
the emerging market countries. As noted, however, the
Core Principles still make use of the Basle Capital Accord.
Therefore, some of the same arguments against the further
expansion of Basle Accord signatory countries apply to the
Core Principles as well. There is rather broad agreement
that the Accord’s methodology has flaws, but certainly
no consensus on what, if any, alternative could or should
replace it. In this section, we will make some observations
regarding two of these alternative prudential methodologies.
We will first consider fair pricing of deposit insurance and
then the so-called precommitment approach.
A. FAIR PRICING OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
John, Saunders, and Senbet (1995) have argued that coun-
tries should adopt fairly priced deposit insurance to avoid
the distorting consequences for resource allocation associ-
ated with capital regulation. They argue that appropriate
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums would provide
bank owners with incentives to put in place optimal
management compensation structures. The motivation for
such a scheme would be to induce managers to avoid
taking risks beyond those that are optimal for an “all-
equity-financed bank.”
The experience in the United States indicates that
implementation of risk-adjusted premiums is a politically
difficult task. The range of risk-adjusted premiums now
charged by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is
about 30 basis points, well below the approximately
100-basis-point range routinely estimated by researchers
in the early 1990s as required to adequately account for
risk differences among banks. The European experience
also suggests that gaining agreement among countries on
adopting risk-adjusted premiums would not be an easy
task. In 1993, the European Commission issued the Direc-
tive on Deposit Guarantees requiring EU member nations
to adopt a national system of deposit insurance that met
broadly agreed-upon standards.13 National authorities
were given wide latitude, however, in implementing the220 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
Directive in their home countries. Countries chose a wide
variety of implementation mechanisms; only two, however,
chose risk-adjusted premiums.14
B. THE PRECOMMITMENT APPROACH
Now let us consider the possibility of substituting a
precommitment-type approach for the current Basle Accord
methodology. Under the precommitment approach, a bank
commits to its regulator that it will not exceed a certain
magnitude of loss for a period to come. Each bank deter-
mines this amount on its own. If the bank violates this
commitment, then it faces a penalty, which must be viewed
as credible in order for the approach to be effective.
To date, there has been little, if any, discussion
regarding the challenges involved in ex post verification
of periodic profit-loss outcomes. The reason for this
dearth of deliberation seems clear—the precommitment
approach raises no new issues in economies with strong
accounting traditions and systems. However, if consider-
ation were to be given to emerging market banks employ-
ing such an approach, verification would become an issue
due to institutional shortcomings in these countries. In
particular, recent discussions on the current operation of
emerging market banking systems suggest that these
systems are often characterized by a lack of transparency,
a scarcity of supervisory personnel with requisite tech-
nical training, incomplete avoidance of conflicts of
interest, and lax safeguarding of corporate assets by
system participants. These deficiencies could undermine
the verification procedure, which is a key aspect of a self-
assessed regulatory approach. This discussion suggests
that, at present, there are significant barriers to the use
of incentive-compatible regulatory schemes in emerging
market economies.
VII. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
So far, we have considered various international agreements
and frameworks for dealing with prudential concerns and
their relevance to a world in which a growing and increas-
ingly diverse group of countries participate in international
markets. As our final topic, we will discuss the arguments
related to the choice of whether to include enforcement
mechanisms in multilateral agreements on capital ade-
quacy and associated prudential issues.
The argument for rewards and penalties is to
provide incentives to participant countries to take actions
that would tend to improve prospects for stability of the
international financial system. Two obstacles, however,
must be overcome. First, it would be difficult to ensure
that enforcement actions are applied fairly and to insulate
them from forces other than those related to prudential
concerns. Second, supervisors would more closely scruti-
nize any proposals if the proposals were connected to a
binding agreement. This would increase the difficulty of
negotiating an agreement.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A lesson of the Asian financial crisis concerns the macro-
economic costs of poorly designed institutional structures.
One of the possible explanations for the persistence of the
tolerance of these structures may be that they afford a com-
petitive advantage to domestic financial institutions of
emerging market countries. The competitive advantage of
these banks is based on their value as intermediaries
between international markets and domestic agents. This
value arises from their knowledge of the intricacies of the
institutional structures in their home countries.
Much of our discussion of the policy problem
assumes that, going forward, emerging market supervisors
will be included in the negotiation of multilateral supervi-
sory understandings. The analysis of the paper suggests
that their participation will influence the outcome of the
nature of understandings among regulators. In particular,
the outcome would likely result in an attainable standard
that is consistent with a process of institutional reform over
time. During this period of reform, emerging market
banks would be insulated from the full consequences of
market discipline and thus would retain some protection of
their competitive status. This would result in an agreed-
upon strategy for integrating emerging market banking
systems into international markets.
When relaxing the assumption that emerging
market supervisors must agree to an international super-
visory standard, the standard would move toward oneFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 221
that permits the most efficient employers of bank capital
to fully exploit their competitive advantages. In the
absence of protected franchises, few emerging market
banks would be able to compete in the market for equity
capital at this time. Under these conditions, one possible
response of emerging market authorities could be to close
off their markets to avoid direct competition between
more efficient foreign banks and their less efficient
domestic institutions. This could well be accompanied by
lessened emphasis on institutional reform efforts. The
costs of these policy measures would presumably be less
real economic integration of emerging market economies
with the international economy. We also cannot discount
the possibility that the less complete and more slowly
implemented institutional reforms will have a negative
impact on systemic risk. This might occur if market partici-
pants failed to take into account in their own risk manage-
ment actions a scaling back of the market-oriented
oversight of banking and other financial supervisors in
emerging market economies.222 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 NOTES
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for International Settlements’ site (http://www.bis.org). It provides an
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main headings of the listing are: 1) legal and juridical framework;
2) accounting, disclosure, and transparency; 3) stakeholder oversight and
institutional governance; 4) market structure; 5) supervisory/regulatory
authority; and 6) design of the safety net.
2. Korean data for deposits at banks by individuals and corporations
show much stronger increases in growth of deposits of individuals in
1996 and 1997. In addition, Korean data show sizeable increases in
foreign-currency-denominated bank loans equal to 47 percent between
the end of 1995 and the end of the third quarter of 1997. That is, the
Korean data appear to be broadly consistent with the circumstances
described in the stylized example (Bank of Korea 1997).
3. See Krugman (1996) for a discussion of conventional currency crisis
theory. See Krugman (1998) for an exposition of a model that
concentrated on the problem of moral hazard in the financial sector and
its macroeconomic consequences.
4. In the discussion of the stylized example, we abstract from the possible
use of collateral. The credit policies in many emerging market economies
are asset based rather than cash-flow based. Because banks do not require
information on cash flows of the underlying asset, they are unable to
evaluate independently the asset’s value through discounted cash flow or
similar methodologies. In such circumstances, collateral should provide the
lender less comfort than when the collateral-assumed values are consistent
with estimates derived from a discounted cash-flow analysis.
5. See Gibson (1997) for a discussion of how the design of an
information system depends on the risk measurement methodology that
a bank chooses.
6. For a discussion of the usefulness of cash-flow analysis in emerging
market countries, see Kane (1995). 
7. For overview discussions of the administration of insolvency laws
across Asia, see Tomasie and Little (1997). Tomasie and Little have
commented on the impact of Confucian philosophy on the resolution of
financially troubled companies in Asia. They suggest that the cultural ideal
of communal risk bearing results in an unwillingness to visit total loss on any
class of stakeholders. Tomasie and Little have also commented on the separate
influence of the European civil law tradition. They have observed that under
this tradition, judges look first to the satisfaction of public policy objectives
and only then consider the proposed resolution’s consistency with the
structure of creditor preference outside of bankruptcy. For a more general
discussion of how the character of legal rules and the quality of law
enforcement affect financial activity, see La Porta et al. (1996, 1997).
8. See Sherer (1998) for an article on the restructuring plan proposed for
Alphatec Electronics PLC.
9. To address this situation, the Korean government proposed
legislation, in early 1998, that would restrict the circumstances in which
management could apply to the courts for protection. Under current
Korean law, a company can file for liquidation, reorganization, or court
mediation. It is estimated that almost all large company filings have been
for court mediation. Korean commentators have asserted that filings for
the court mediation option are often undertaken by managements
seeking to retain authority rather than for the purpose of present
liquidation. Under the proposed legislation, debtor companies would not
be permitted to withdraw from a proceeding once an order has been
issued. It is anticipated that this change would address the problem of
management abuse of the process. 
10. However, the agreement did not call for limiting the benefits to
signatories. For example, applications to the Federal Reserve from banks
from countries that adhere to the Accord are required to meet the Basle
guidelines as administered by their home country supervisors. An
applicant from a country not subscribing to the Basle Accord is required
to provide information regarding the capital standard applied by the
home country regulator, as well as information required to make data
submitted comparable to the Basle framework. See Misback (1993).
11. The gist of the U.S. implementation of prompt corrective action is
to limit the discretion available to regulators with respect to the actions
they require bank owners to take in response to lowered capital ratios. In
contrast, the Japanese implementation can be interpreted as providing a
menu of options for supervisors.
12. In its use here, the term Accord should be broadly construed to refer
to the public documents that have been issued by the Basle Committee.
13. For details on the EU Directive on Deposit Guarantees, see
McKenzie and Khalidi (1994).
14. Portugal and Sweden employ risk-adjusted deposit insurance
premiums. The only other foreign countries with risk-adjusted deposit
insurance premiums are Argentina and Bulgaria. See Garcia (1997). REFERENCES
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